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Post by Amboy Secondary on Apr 9, 2016 4:25:51 GMT -8
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Post by edwardsutorik on Apr 9, 2016 6:59:27 GMT -8
"Shunting isn't entirely reliable, experts said..."
I find that a very curious thing to say. I believe (or hope) what they're talking about is that shunting a track does nothing to protect workers from trains operating on adjacent non-shunted tracks. Of course, then you shunt them, too.
Another way to look at it is that shunting offers no protection if you don't actually install it. Say, in this case here.
Still another is that it has to be installed correctly.
But what comes up over and over is the assertion that workers need to be protected from "on high". Not much on how the guys actually at risk should be taking care of their own safety. They, certainly, should be the most inspired.
One change I think I would advocate is that all tracks occupied or obstructed by workers will be properly shunted. And there will be surprise inspections and firings, as appropriate.
This seems so obvious that I view management as criminally negligent for not already doing it.
Ed
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Post by Amboy Secondary on Apr 9, 2016 14:17:57 GMT -8
Amtrak's rules - policies - practices all provide for the protection of roadway workers. However, all involved, management, labor and contractors must all buy in to these rules - policies and practices 100% of the time. These are self contained, self directed work units, we are talking about. They are professionals required to attain and maintain their professional qualifications annually. They have to accept responsibility for their own actions. If the worker, on the ground, chooses not to comply with these practices, nothing is going to stop him from violating the rules, especially on a Sunday morning.
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Post by edwardsutorik on Apr 9, 2016 16:05:46 GMT -8
Which brings up another point. It's important to get "employee buy-in" on safety measures. If they BELIEVE in them, why would they not do them? Sunday morning or not.
With my comments above about firing people who don't use a shunt, I would also like to convince them that it's for THEIR benefit. Not management's.
If I believe a shunt will throw my block red, whether on not I "really" have authority, or whether the dispatcher "really" did the right thing, I believe I'd apply it. However, if I thought it was a lot of hoowie from management, maybe I'd ignore it.
It's sorta like believing someone has shut off a power line before I work on it. Sure, it's nice to believe they did it. And will not "ferget" and throw it back on. But I feel SO much better when I put a ground on the line, and see for myself that I'm covered in case the "impossible" happens.
Ed
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Post by mlehman on Apr 9, 2016 16:58:36 GMT -8
Secondhand to me, but the issue of the shift change being a factor seems to be a significant part of this. My wife hangs out with some people on Friday evenings that are with the RR engineering program here at the big U. Happened to include an Amtrak employee this week and he confirmed that is one thing they're looking specifically at. As makes sense, each shift is supposed to be responsible for managing its authority to use the tracks. Similar to how Ed laid out, it's a lot like electricians now must do when working a circuit or how blue flags are used on the RR by carmen, for instance. The crew puts their own lock on the breaker or switch and only they can take it off.
The shift being relieved apparently dropped its shunt as required and the day shift should have put theirs in it place. Then there was a train where it shouldn't have been...
Obviously some explanation for that. It's kind of cold comfort to say that if everyone follows the rules 100% of the time everything will be cool. But rules also need to accommodate the fact that humans just aren't 100% reliable. That's why there are redundancies built into many aspects of safety around the RR...you want fail-safe, not fail-danger. So the lesson here might be, in part, follow the rules, but for the future it also needs to include some sort of back-up for those occasions when humans fail. It may not be possible for that to always be between you and danger, but this certainly seems to be the case where it should have been.
And assuming PTC actively covered this section of track, it does point out that its implementation takes more than wiring it up and flipping the power switch to ON. Policy and procedures, as well as work rules, all seem to need examination here.
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Post by canrailfan on Apr 9, 2016 17:18:26 GMT -8
The rules concerning occupancy authority and applying protective shunts are conceived and written in the context of the track itself. Holding an authority and applying shunts for work being done on Track 2 provides a very narrow safety zone on a 4 track main with track spacing as close as it is on the Corridor.
I'd expect that the experienced work crew had the necessary authority to be on Track 2 and had placed shunts on Track 2 if required by the rules. However, a backhoe is a very maneuverable machine and not limited to staying between the rails. It could very easily be driven in and out of the 'safe zone' of Track 2, encroaching on Tracks 1 and 3 as it was working. No harm, no foul..., most of the time.
My feeling is that the backhoe was accidentally driven into the path of Amtrak 89 because the operator was focused on his work and no warning was given of the approaching train. The locomotive forward-looking camera will hold the answer to this question.
(Don't some railroads require workers to stop work and move clear of the tracks when a train passes the work site? Given the speed of trains in the corridor, this would seem to be a desirable precaution.)
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Post by edwardsutorik on Apr 9, 2016 17:52:36 GMT -8
It could very easily be driven in and out of the 'safe zone' of Track 2, encroaching on Tracks 1 and 3 as it was working. No harm, no foul..., most of the time. My feeling is that the backhoe was accidentally driven into the path of Amtrak 89 because the operator was focused on his work and no warning was given of the approaching train. The locomotive forward-looking camera will hold the answer to this question. I am sympathetic for people in a situation where they've got to, just for a "second", obstruct a non-protected track. Here's what you do: You have a guy looking up the track. A guy looking down the track. A guy on the backhoe. And YOU watch it all like a momma hawk. I do similar things, too, sometimes. But I am VERY aware of the situation. If I were to own a track, I should be able to eat my lunch and read a book and not die. If I don't own it, I REALLY have to cover all the bases. I recently read a caption of a photo in a New Haven book about a buncha guys standing around watching a passenger train go by. A long time ago. It wasn't because they were lazy or on break. Besides being safely out of the way, it was noted they could look over the train while it went by. A side benefit. Ed
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Post by Amboy Secondary on Apr 9, 2016 18:36:47 GMT -8
Mike: The issue of the shift change is major, and probably the first domino to fall.
Background: Amtrak, MW gangs work four ten hour days. Frequently, during production season, they work two gangs, with one day of overlap, so there is production seven days per week. Most of this is overnight, when there is less traffic. The practice is to clear up prior to 0530, so that train movement is not interfered with. This schedule also allows travel to/from the crew base, as well as safety instruction and a mandatory job briefing, before start of work.
Once the Night foreman gave #3 and #1 back to the Train Dispatcher, and cleared up, the track(s) became live, and no further MW work could be done, until the new track foreman asked for and was given permission to foul #3 and/or #1. Once this permission was established, then protective devices would be applied and work would continue until either the work was completed or the dispatcher asked for the track back. For some reason, this did not happen, and the backhoe ended up where it was not supposed to be.
It is being alleged that the two foreman did not have a face to face turnover, and possibly did not communicate at all. So it is conceivable, that the relieving foreman was not aware the tracks were back in service. However, when in doubt, the safest course must be taken, which meant ascertaining from the Train Dispatcher, the status of the adjoining tracks, before beginning work.
FWIW, Amtrak rules require roadway workers to stop work when a train is passing on an adjacent track as well as to remain clear of the track. Having been on the ground at work sites, the trains tend to sneak up on you, and you don't hear them until they are on top of you. That's why Amtrak employed advance watchmen with air can horns to warn workers of a train's approach.
There is still a lot of contradictory information emanating from sources close to the investigation. However, the focus is now on the conduct of the track men at the location of the accident. The FRA Emergency Order confirms that focus. There are still too many unanswered questions.
Joe
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Post by Deleted on Apr 9, 2016 21:26:13 GMT -8
I am sympathetic for people in a situation where they've got to, just for a "second", obstruct a non-protected track. Here's what you do: You have a guy looking up the track. A guy looking down the track. A guy on the backhoe. And YOU watch it all like a momma hawk. I do similar things, too, sometimes. But I am VERY aware of the situation. If I were to own a track, I should be able to eat my lunch and read a book and not die. If I don't own it, I REALLY have to cover all the bases. Ed Primary causes of railroad accidents are shortcuts and complacency.
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